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Abstract: The present paper attempts to examine the normative criteria of RIDF devolution by NABARD in 
reducing inter and intra state disparity in terms of sanction of per capita RIDF over the study period 1996 to 2010. 
Following Spiezia (2002), Adjusted Geographic Concentration index has been used to test the nature and sources of 
concentration of per capita sanction of RIDF. The empirical findings support a relatively high degree of 
concentrations in devolution of such fund among the states. The study also identifies the sources of such 
concentration. The underlying reasons behind such inter and intra state disparity in per capita sanction of RIDF is 
mainly the matching grant scheme applied to all the states and the twenty percentages reward formula under such 
devolution criteria. This study strongly recommended the review of the normative criteria for devolution of RIDF set 
by the NABARD by removing the matching grant scheme and restricting the twenty percentage reward formula, for 
the less developed states including the states in the north eastern region only for achieving the goal of balanced 
regional development of rural infrastructure. 
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1. Introduction: Balanced regional growth has always been a significant objective of the Indian 
national plans. Starting from the First Plan, to achieve the goal of balanced regional 
development, the Finance Commission and the Planning Commission always determines the 
funds devolution to state governments by assigning a significantly high weight on relative 
backwardness of the states. The contemporary literature on balanced vis-à-vis unbalanced growth 
doctrine differs significantly in this devolution formula of transfer of funds from the central 
government to the different state governments. The proponents of the unbalanced growth 
doctrine argued for selection of investment projects purely on the basis of larger total linkage 
effects which is the sum of backward linkage effect and forward linkage effect. The benefits 
arising out of such investment projects are expected to trickle down to the other sector. If it is 
established that national growth will lead to convergence in regional incomes then growth in 
richer states will trickle down to poorer states in due course of time. In that case, emphasis 
should be on economic growth rather than regional backwardness while distributing resources to 
the state governments. This policy of deliberate unbalanced growth strategy is likely to be useful 
for any economy which is yet to ‘take off’ or just reached the take off stage. The convergence 
theorem as propounded by Barro (1991) postulates that when the growth rate of an economy 
accelerates, initially some regions with better resources would grow faster than others. But after 
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sometime, when the law of diminishing marginal returns set in, first growth rates would 
converge, due to differential marginal productivity of capital (higher in poorer regions and lower 
in richer regions), and this in turn would bridge the gaps in the levels of income across regions 
over time. Though, the cross country empirical results are some time controversial, the reduction 
in the level of regional disparity in China after economic reform supports this proposition. 
On the other hand, the alternate hypothesis advocated for achieving balanced regional growth 
and proposed in favour of sacrificing some growth if divergence in regional incomes has stronger 
ground. Needless to mention that in India, different regions with different resource bases and 
endowments level would have a dissimilar growth path over time. One of the reasons why 
centralized planning was advocated earlier on the expectation that it could restrain the regional 
disparity. In spite of planning, however, the regional disparity remained a serious problem in 
India. In India, the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) accelerated since 1980s. The 
average annual GDP growth rate in the first three decades (1950s to 1980s) was only 3.6 
percentages. During the 1980s, the GDP growth rate accelerated to 5.6 percent, and after 
economic reforms in the 1990s, it has further accelerated to 6.0 percentages or even expected up 
to 8.5 percentages. The pattern of sectoral composition of GDP growth in India is predominantly 
service led growth coupled with a declining trend in its contribution from the primary sector 
which becomes a serious concern among the development planner and policy makers.  
During the Budget speech of 1995-96, the then finance minister of Government of India 
expressed the consciousness over the declining trend in public investment in agriculture and rural 
infrastructure mainly due to severe resource crunch experienced by the different state 
governments on the one hand and the inability of the Commercial Banks to channelize 18 
percentages of their total lending to agriculture as required under priority sector guidelines due to 
inadequate infrastructural base in rural and agricultural sector. Against this backdrop, the 
Government of India announced a scheme for setting up of Rural Infrastructure Development 
Fund (RIDF) with NABARD as the nodal agency towards financing of, at that point of time, the 
ongoing rural infrastructure projects in irrigation sector. Subsequently, RIDF was made available 
for new projects as well and its ambit was broadened to cover almost all important aspects of 
rural infrastructure.  
During the launch of RIDF schemes by NABARD, the devolution of state wise allocation of this 
fund was decided to be made available in accordance with the normative criteria which include 
geographical area, population, inverse of infrastructure index, inverse of rural CD ratio and the 
previous performance under RIDF sanctions and disbursements. Clearly, this was a move 
towards performance based programme budgeting system to achieve the twin goal of generating 
infrastructural base for rural economy and reducing the intra and inter rural disparity among the 
different states and or region of India.   
Against this backdrop, the objective of this paper is to investigate the nature of disparity of per 
capita availability of such RIDF sanction across the different states and evaluate its actual 
performance against the expected standard. For this, we consider the Adjusted Geographic 
concentration (AGC) index over the period of study and analyse the trend of disparity of per 
capita devolution to understand the nature and extent of such spatial concentration of sanction of 
per capita RIDF for the different states. 
To pursue the aforesaid objective, the present paper has been divided into five sections. 
Including the present Introductory one, the remaining paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
provides the theoretical exposition and related studies with this study. Section 3 deals with 
sources of data and the methodological framework utilized to test the nature of regional disparity 
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in devolution of per capita RIDF fund across the states. Results are discussed in Section 4. 
Finally, this paper concludes in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Related Studies: Since the balanced regional growth is one of the principal objectives of the 
developing world, the major precondition for attaining such goal, however, is the availability and 
flow of required quantum of infrastructure in the economy. Since, the deficiency of infrastructure 
will definitely slow down the growth process. In most of the developing countries including 
India, the status of actual availability of infrastructure, particularly the in rural sector, is quite 
low against its actual requirement by the respective countries. The demand for infrastructure is 
growing at a much faster rate for the last three decades where as the supply is more or less 
stagnant mostly due to structural reasons. The rapid pace of urbanization and globalization across 
the world further aggravates the demand supply gap of infrastructure day by day. Lewis (1955) 
pointed out that the development of infrastructure in rural sector is anticipated to stimulate 
economic growth, create jobs, diversify economy and improve the quality of life in the country 
In a nutshell, it has long been assumed that the balanced government investment paved the way 
for further investment from the private sectors. But, it is a fact that the nature of investment in 
the infrastructural sector never attained any significant attention from the private investors in a 
large scale. Even the classical economists, who identified the private sector as the ‘main’ engine 
of growth of an economy through efficient utilization of resources of any country or region also 
admitted this particular fact and advocated for larger state intervention. They also believed that 
the state should take utmost care to provide the required infrastructural facility for proper 
functioning of the private sector. This particular aspect of market failure in infrastructural sector 
was raised by Hirschman (1958). Since, infrastructural base is necessary and may not be 
sufficient for the proper functioning of private sector organisations. 
In a country like India, where the major proportions of the population lives in rural areas, the 
rural infrastructure is crucial for overall economic development of the country as a whole and 
development of the rural areas, in particular. As mentioned earlier, the infrastructure projects, 
particularly in the rural sector, involve huge initial investments, long gestation periods, high 
incremental capital output ratio, high risk and a very low rate of returns on investment. This 
simply creates a barrier for inducement to invest into infrastructure by the private player. 
Investment in infrastructure in rural sector is necessary for increasing the productivity and 
efficiency of agriculture in the form of improving the credit absorbing capacity, enhancing the 
productivity of crops and livestock, generating employment and increasing farmers’ income etc. 
which ultimately directly reduce the incidence of rural poverty (Rostow: 1960) 
However, the micro aspect of need for rural infrastructure was first raised by Wharton (1967) 
who classified the agricultural infrastructure into three distinct categories. It may be of capital 
intensive type or of capital extensive type or transport related infrastructure. He further pointed 
out that these infrastructures will generate positive externalities at the micro level since 
infrastructural base in the rural sector will pave the way for inducement to investment potential 
in rural sector by the local producers. Following the same line, the World Development Report 
of 1994 (World Bank, 1994) broadly defined the term infrastructure as following:  
(i) Public utilities-power, telecommunications, piped water supply, sanitation and sewerage, 
solid waste collection and disposal and piped gas. 
(ii) Public works-roads, major dam and canal works for irrigation and drainage. 
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(iii)Other transport sectors-urban and inter-urban railways, urban transport, ports and 
waterways, and airports.  
 
2.1 Infrastructure for Rural Economy: The models of development which focuses on 
agriculture also bring about the role that infrastructure play in agricultural development in 
particular. The spread of technology in agriculture depends critically on both physical and 
institutional infrastructure. Rural infrastructure leads to agricultural expansion by increasing 
yields, farmers’ access to markets and availability of institutional finance. World Bank (1994) 
identified that rural infrastructure plays a key role in reaching the large mass of rural poor. When 
rural infrastructure has deteriorated or is nonexistent, the cost of marketing farm produce will be 
prohibitive for poor farmers. Poor rural infrastructure also limits the ability of traders to travel to 
and communicate with remote farming areas, limiting market access from these areas and 
eliminating competition for their produce. Construction of rural roads almost inevitably leads to 
increase in agricultural production and productivity by bringing in new land into cultivation or 
by intensifying existing land use to take advantage of expanded market opportunities. Later, 
World Bank (1997) estimated that 15 percentages of crop produce is lost between the farm gate 
and the consumer due to inefficient and inappropriate storage facilities, thereby adversely 
influencing the income of farmers. Previously, Mellor (1976) pointed out that strengthening rural 
infrastructure can help to lower production costs which can further augment agricultural output 
and income for rural farmers. It is also indicated that infrastructure plays a strategic role in 
generating multiplier effects in the economy with agricultural growth. Since, the kind of 
infrastructure put in place also determines whether growth does all that it can to reduce poverty. 
Most of the poor are in rural areas, and the growth of farm productivity and non-farm rural 
employment is linked interdependently to infrastructural provision. In the same line, Ahmed 
(1996) observed that development of transport and communication infrastructure enhances the 
mobility of people and information through reduction in cost and time. The resulting increase in 
interaction contributes to changes in attitudes and human capital development.  
Binswanger, Deininger et al (1993), in a study of 13 states in India, examined the impacts of 
investments in rural infrastructure in terms of lowered transportation costs, increased farmers’ 
access to markets and concluded that the agricultural sector expanded substantially during the 
study period. Fan, Hazell and Haque (1998) extend these results to show that rural infrastructure 
is not only an important driver for total productivity growth, but also directly contributes to a 
substantial reduction in rural poverty. They find that the investment in rural infrastructure can be 
treated as a cause and result of total factor productivity (TFP) changes, thereby reducing the 
extent of rural poverty through increase in the productivity in the agricultural sector. From their 
study, it is clear that these two goals are complementary in nature rather than substitute. 
According to their analysis, it leads to new (non) agricultural employment opportunities, higher 
wages, and increases in productivity. They further pointed out that among the different 
components of rural infrastructure; government expenditure on rural roads has the highest degree 
of linkage effect in reducing rural poverty. They also estimated the elasticity of incidence of rural 
poverty reduction and TFP with respect to government expenditure on rural roads. If the 
government were to increase its investment in roads by Rs 100 billion (at 1993 constant prices), 
the incidence of rural poverty would be reduced by 0.87 percentage and TFP would increase by 
3.03 percentages and investment in agricultural research extension would contribute to 6.08 
percentages growth in total factor productivity and 0.48 percentage reduction in rural poverty. 
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From this brief survey of literature, it is clear that the importance of infrastructure in agriculture 
and rural development is well documented. However, the existing literature is mainly 
concentrates on the effect of rural infrastructure in reducing poverty and change in TFP. But in a 
federal structural like India, how far the nature of devolution of rural infrastructure fund 
attributes towards balanced regional development has not yet been tested considering capita 
sanction of such funds across the states. In this sense, this paper shall attempt to fill that caveat in 
the existing literature. 
 
3. Data & Methodology 
3.1 Data: In order to investigate the regional disparity of sanction of RIDF in India, secondary 
data regarding state wise disbursement figure as on March 31, 2010 have been collected. For 
this, state wise disbursement of RIDF in different tranches (I to XV) has been compiled for all 
the states except the data for the Union Territories. For ambiguity in using interpolations and 
extrapolations methods to calculate year wise rural population in three newly constituted states, 
their data are combined with their mother states from where they were bifurcated (the data for 
Jharkhand, Uttaranchal and Chhattisgarh are combined with the data for Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and 
Madhya Pradesh, respectively). The year wise rural populations figure are extrapolated from the 
Census of 1991, 2001 and 2011. The data regarding state wise disbursement of RIDF are 
prepared on the basis of various reports of NABARD where as area share of the states are 
approximated from the various reports published by the Registrar General of India, Government 
of India, New Delhi. Due to non availability of data on rural area of any state for the study 
period, we use actual area figure off all the states accepting the downward bias in aggregation. 
The present study consider the period 1995-96 to 2009-10 as per the annual reports of the 
NABARD are concerned where as the actual rural population for that period is approximated by 
the year end figure for the respective states.  
 
3.2 Methodology: The study has utilised the Adjusted Geographic Concentration index (AGC) 
proposed by Spiezia, (2002) to through light on the RIDF disbursement procedures of 
NABARD. The per capita disbursement of RIDF in different states in each period with their 
corresponding ranges at all India levels as well are also considered for participating states in 
different years. 
We start with the common measure of concentration is the Herfindahl index (H), may be defined 
as: 
 
 
Equation (1) 
 
where iy  is the RIDF disbursement share for State i and N stands for the number of States.  The 
index lies between 1/N (all states have the same disbursement of RIDF share, i.e. there is no 
concentration) and 1 (all sanction of RIDF is concentrated in one state, i.e. maximum 
concentration).  In general, however, states have different areas so that a correct measure of 
geographic concentration has to compare the sanction of RIDF share of each state with its share 
in the national territory.   
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3.2.1 The Adjusted Geographic Concentration (AGC) index:  In order to cope up with this 
type of regional differences, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) proposed: 
 
Equation (2) 
 
where ia  is the area of state i as a percentage of the country area. If the disbursement of RIDF 
share of each state equals its relative area, then there is no concentration (EG equals 0) and larger 
value of EG indicates higher geographic concentration. However, the major drawback of the EG 
index is that it is very sensitive to the level of aggregation of regional data.  This feature is due to 
the fact that the differences between the disbursement of RIDF share and relative area of each 
state are squared. 
To correct this bias related to aggregation, Spiezia (2002) reformulated the EG index further to 
correct this bias due to aggregation into the following index of Geographic Concentration (GC): 
 
 
Equation (3) 
 
where │ │ indicates the absolute value.  Obviously, the aggregation bias would be smaller for 
the GC index than for the EG index. 
The maximum value of the GC index is the equal to: 
 
 Equation (4) 
 
 
where mina  denotes the relative area of the smallest state under study. 
The GC index, therefore, is not regionally comparable if the size of regions (states) differs 
systematically within the country. A natural correction for this second aggregation bias is 
provided by the adjusted geographic concentration index (AGC), which may be defined as 
 
MAXGCGCAGC / ; AGC € [0,1] Equation (5) 
 
 
3.2.2 Decomposition of the AGC index: The AGC index can further be decomposed into two 
components: geographic concentration of population and territorial disparity. In the case of per 
capita sanction of RIDF across the states can be considered as: 
 
Equation (6) 
 
where ip  is the population share of state i. 
Therefore, the AGC index for per capita sanction of RIDF across the states can be rewritten as 
 
Equation (7) 
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The first term on the right-hand measures the effect of territorial disparity in sanction of RIDF 
per capita and the second term the effect of geographic concentration of population. Obviously, 
the AGC index lies between 0, indicating no concentration and 1, implying maximum concentration for 
all states. 
 
4. Results and Discussions:  The empirical results are summarised in Table 1. For analytical 
purpose, we divide the states in two broad categories viz. Major states and the states in the north 
eastern region. 
Table 1: Projects, Sanctions, Disbursements, Outstanding as on March 31, 2010 (Rs. In Crores) 
States 
No. of 
Projects 
Cumulative RIDF Loan 
RIDF Tranches (Share 
Percentage of states) 
Sanctioned Disbursed % I to XV I to X XI to XV 
1 Andhra 23,944 11,749.73 8,090.34 69 7.58 14.24 9.35 
2 Bihar (Combined) 17,551 6315.27 3067.23 49 9.24 2.25 8.69 
3 Goa 198 328.13 200.29 61 0.95 0.16 0.42 
4 Gujarat 43,155 8,210.32 6,280.94 77 6.22 9.08 7.12 
5 Haryana 2,337 2,621.09 1,815.75 69 3.48 2.63 2.46 
6 Himachal Pradesh 6,153 2,691.20 1,714.95 64 2.91 2.42 2.71 
7 J & K 4,171 3,156.40 2,082.07 66 4.18 2.43 3.46 
8 Karnataka 26,741 5,555.21 3,491.45 63 4.20 5.56 5.22 
9 Kerala 3,374 2,950.71 1,910.69 65 2.26 3.18 2.62 
10 M. P. (Combined) 4836 9100.79 5929.58 65 8.07 9.94 7.98 
11 Maharashtra 24,143 6,633.54 4,643.33 70 5.85 6.91 6.04 
12 Orissa 87,875 4,870.75 2,617.13 54 4.86 4.43 4.88 
13 Punjab 6,871 3,925.11 2,914.59 74 3.54 4.00 3.64 
14 Rajasthan 23,604 6,331.96 4,197.40 66 6.50 4.91 6.92 
15 Tamilnadu 23,767 7,194.40 5,585.10 78 5.44 7.34 6.66 
16 U. P. (Combined) 44431 10450.01 7298.87 70 11.46 10.16 10.01 
17 W. Bengal 52,207 6,259.58 3,825.98 61 5.90 6.87 5.47 
Total 395,258 98,344.2 65,665.69 67     
  N. E. States          
18 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 87 734.66 457.89 62 0.36 0.57 0.80 
19 Assam 1,102 1846.20 1163.75 63 1.92 1.57 1.92 
20 Manipur 2,782 57.71 24.88 43 0.02 0.03 0.08 
21 Meghalaya 566 445.31 261.53 59 0.86 0.31 0.51 
22 Mizoram 229 215.78 160.79 75 0.48 0.21 0.20 
23 Nagaland 787 627.18 255.73 41 1.20 0.30 0.81 
24 Sikkim 1,140 396.78 154.60 39 1.14 0.13 0.55 
25 Tripura 769 916.85 271.45 30 0.91 0.37 1.23 
Total 7,462 5,240.47 2,750.62 52     
RIDF Total 402,806 103,718.00 68,439.74 66    
NRRDA, Delhi   18,500.00 18,500.00 100    
Grand Total   122,218.00 86,939.74 71    
Source: Authors’ Calculation based on Annual Reports of NABARD 
Note:  
1. 'Tranche': RIDF loans sanctioned during a financial year are covered under that tranche. 
2. 'Disbursement': After the sanction, disbursements take place during the following 4-5 years, as per progress of the implementation of 
projects. 
3. 'Ongoing Tranches': During any given year, disbursements take place concurrently from several ongoing tranches. 
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The above table clearly shows that as on March 31, 2010 the states in the north eastern region 
jointly receive only 7462 number of projects which is only 1.853 percentages of the total projects 
under RIDF scheme over the study period. Again, actual disbursement figure against the 
sanctioned amount for different project shows that it is 52 percentages for the states in the north 
eastern region but the averages for the major state is near about 67 percentages. This figure goes 
up to a maximum of 77 percentages for Gujarat and the minimum figure is only 30 percentages 
with Tripura. The planner also realised this fact. It is evident from the fact that the disbursement 
pattern of RIDF tranches in terms of share percentages of different states revealed that during the 
first ten Tranches of RIDF, the share of the states in the north eastern region received only 3.50 
percentages but it reached the level of 6.11 percentages during the next five RIDF tranches. This 
clearly implies that the level of regional convergence of disbursement of RIDF in different 
tranches hardly realised the objective of balanced regional disbursement of such fund, at least at 
the state level. Moreover, the pattern of disbursement of such fund also revealed that among the 
major states, Bihar (Combined) is lagging from the other major states with a significantly low 
percentage of disbursement of RIDF. Perhaps, due to the criteria of matching grant scheme of 
RIDF. The same argument is applicable to the north eastern states, too. This matching grant 
scheme renders the deficit pronged states to apply for such schemes avoiding the actual need of 
their respective backwardness in rural infrastructure on the one hand and it also gives an 
opportunity to the relatively larger states with greater financial strength to increase their share in 
RIDF schemes in the current tranches on the basis of their performance in earlier tranches. 
Ultimately, it creates a double liability for the planner as it simply widens the gap between the 
relatively richer states with the states suffering from huge infrastructural backlog, particularly in 
their rural sector. 
Further, the per capita sanction of RIDF for the different states over the study period is also not 
satisfactory. The minimum per capita RIDF actually sanctioned ranges from Rupees 2.00 in 
1996, 2005 and 2010 for Bihar (Combined), Manipur and Karnataka, respectively. The 
maximum per capita sanction of RIDF for the same period is Rupees100.00, Rupees 399.00 and 
Rupees 1114.00 for Goa, Gujarat and again Goa, respectively. The same macro trend of regional 
concentration of sanction of state level RIDF, discussed above is maintained in per capita 
sanction of RIDF for the states, too. The minimum figure for Karnataka in 2010 is little bit 
surprising when the state is continuously receiving a good average of such fund. It is perhaps due 
to some administrative reason that it has not applied for the fund in a mass scale following 
previous trend. 
Among the states in the north eastern region, performance of the per capita sanction of RIDF is 
not satisfactory, again. Manipur has been sanctioned RIDF only four time. Tripura has not 
participated in RIDF scheme for seven years. Starting from the fifth tranche of RIDF, Arunachal 
Pradesh continuously is getting relatively higher per capita sanction of RIDF. Arunachal Pradesh 
receives the four digit per capita sanction of RIDF in sixth tranches which is highest per capita 
sanction of RIDF for the states in the north eastern region till the end of fifteenth tranche of 
RIDF introduced by the NABARD.  
These are summarised in Table 2 (See Appendix-A) 
4.1 Adjusted Geographic Concentration (AGC) Index: From the information reported in 
Table 3, it is revealed that out of fifteen trances, the degree of extent of effect of territorial 
disparity on per capita sanction of RIDF overcomes the degree of extent of effect of geographic 
concentration of population on per capita sanction of RIDF for one third of the tranches in 
influencing the value of the index. It implies that the normative criterion of fund devolution 
- 9 - 
 
under RIDF scheme by the NABARD emphasized more on the relative size of the rural 
population than that of the area figure of any state. For the remaining tranches, we observe just 
the opposite result. The effect of territorial disparity on per capita sanction of RIDF as a source 
of concentration reaches its maximum in sixth tranche and reaches its minimum in twelfth 
tranche with values 54 percentages and only one percentage, respectively. The relative 
contribution of the effect of geographic concentration of rural population on per capita sanction 
of RIDF as a source of concentration has the same minimum value of one percentage in eighth 
tranche where as it reaches its maximum of 47 percentages in eleventh tranche. 
                          Table 3: Decomposition of AGC Index of Per Capita Sanction  
of RIDF during the Study Period 1996-2010 
Sources of 
Concentration 
 
 
RIDF    
Tranches 
Effect of 
Territorial 
Disparity on 
PC Sanction 
of RIDF 
Effect of Geographic 
Concentration of Rural 
Population on PC 
Sanction of RIDF 
AGC   
Index 
I 0.31 0.26 0.57 
II 0.21 0.37 0.58 
II 0.19 0.32 0.51 
IV 0.20 0.31 0.51 
V 0.15 0.33 0.48 
VI 0.54 0.04 0.58 
VII 0.43 0.14 0.57 
VIII 0.47 0.01 0.48 
IX 0.31 0.34 0.65 
X 0.46 0.31 0.77 
XI 0.11 0.47 0.58 
XII 0.14 0.39 0.53 
XII 0.01 0.39 0.40 
XIV 0.07 0.45 0.52 
XV 0.10 0.45 0.55 
    Source: Authors’ Calculation based on various Annual Reports of NABARD 
 
As noted earlier, the AGC index lies between 0 (no concentration) and 1 (maximum 
concentration) for all states. The AGC values are all positive for all the fifteen tranches thereby 
implying that there is concentration of sanction of RIDF among the states. The index reaches its 
maximum of 77 percentages in tenth tranche where as the minimum appeared for twelfth tranche 
with a value of 40 percentages. Even if, we assume 50 percentages as a benchmark, only three 
cases fall below this assumed value, implying a tendency towards greater degree of 
concentration, whatever the sources may be. This trend is depicted in the following figure: 
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Figure 1: Trend of AGC over the different RIDF Tranches 
 
     Source: Authors’ Calculation based on various Annual Reports of NABARD 
 
The tendency of AGC index towards a larger value clearly indicates that the sanction and 
disbursement of per capita RIDF among the states raises some question about the objective of 
balanced regional development of rural infrastructure across the country so far as its normative 
devolution criteria is concerned. When the national planners at all levels are trying to emphasize 
a more balanced regional development, the present criteria of sanction of RIDF across the states 
is mainly boosting the relatively developed states to utilise the fund in desired direction at the 
cost of the relatively financially deficit pronged states or the special category states like the states 
in the north eastern region. The matching grant scheme for participating in this scheme further 
render the relatively deficit pronged states to apply for fund according to their actual 
requirement. Consequently, the excess fund that could have been utilised by these states 
ultimately goes to the major states on the basis of the 20 percentages reward formula as 
prescribed by NABARD. 
 
 
5. Conclusions: The present paper reveals that the criteria of fund devolution of RIDF Schemes 
as prescribed by NABARD should undergo a massive change towards reducing the wide spread 
disparity of sanction of per capita RIDF which can promote inter and intra rural disparity among 
the states. Firstly, the matching grant scheme may be withdrawn, particularly for all those states 
which are predominantly backward. Secondly, the 20 percentages reward formula of RIDF 
disbursement should be extended only to the identified backward states and not to the others in 
order to maintain a progressive structure of the fund devaluation among the different states. 
Thirdly, the RIDF Schemes should be tagged with other central and state initiatives of integrated 
rural development programme; and last but not the least, the initiatives taken by the central 
government and the respective state governments should be complementary in nature and not the 
substitutes for effective use of this fund towards reducing inter and intra state disparity in rural 
infrastructure. 
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APPENDIX-A 
 
Table 2: Per Capita Sanction of RIDF in different Tranches: 1996- 2010 (Rupees) 
States/ RIDF 
Tranche I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV 
Andhra Pradesh 41 58 47 50 65 93 101 136 117 217 181 101 122 90 42 
Bihar 
(Combined) 2 0 4 11 11 0 4 16 10 16 44 39 60 53 20 
Goa 100 0 0 129 0 134 151 160 0 0 0 0 150 1518 1114 
Gujarat 49 38 44 29 57 146 7 91 284 399 234 101 145 225 109 
Haryana 14 44 43 33 54 41 95 161 83 101 107 147 116 78 80 
Himachal 
Pradesh 28 101 93 146 198 233 326 284 203 138 314 293 202 278 236 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 9 0 34 141 145 204 280 209 191 55 98 504 419 175 153 
Karnataka 48 54 48 49 47 79 62 59 75 105 111 112 121 31 2 
Kerala 38 32 32 24 50 67 69 75 34 82 62 85 91 128 43 
Madhya Pradesh 
(Combined) 46 51 57 48 55 51 53 120 91 78 59 91 86 55 53 
Maharashtra 32 38 46 51 60 74 81 72 10 13 6 73 138 94 37 
Orissa 55 47 57 38 32 28 45 68 50 89 86 110 56 62 8 
Punjab 40 40 54 47 57 124 131 125 159 175 150 277 163 182 79 
Rajasthan 30 32 34 12 28 57 82 65 28 52 105 109 118 126 50 
Tamilnadu 0 62 53 41 62 66 96 104 143 161 140 203 218 150 91 
Uttar Pradesh 
(Combined) 23 33 31 31 23 16 21 27 36 51 48 54 55 44 28 
West Bengal 15 26 29 34 31 62 65 58 33 51 60 56 53 58 29 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 0 0 0 0 264 1061 773 0 127 245 714 929 115 461 152 
Assam 0 28 7 23 51 19 0 26 58 5 135 70 16 16 21 
Manipur 6 0 0 0 0 43 0 0 0 2 0 84 0 0 0 
Meghalaya 20 0 39 49 158 155 89 77 68 0 102 82 204 107 113 
Mizoram 49 0 0 0 968 84 160 43 284 143 393 163 438 20 375 
Nagaland 11 0 0 0 103 295 6 41 105 180 221 138 97 278 192 
Sikkim 0 0 0 382 156 95 106 101 68 166 133 339 765 847 22 
Tripura 0 0 0 69 68 106 0 152 12 0 0 170 68 332 0 
MINIMUM PC 
SANCTION 2 26 4 11 11 16 4 16 10 2 6 39 16 16 2 
MAXIMUM PC 
SANCTION 100 101 93 382 968 1061 773 284 284 399 714 929 765 1518 1114 
Source: Authors’ Calculation based on Annual Reports of NABARD 
 
Note: Range of Per Capita (PC) Sanctions of RIDF is calculated only for the participating states 
in a given Tranche, thereby omitting unnecessary zero figures. 
 
 
 
